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Abstract: In this paper an attempt has been made to review the financial restructuring process and 
its importance for economic growth and macroeconomic stability. The main focus is on the 
financial restructuring efforts undertaken by the government of Pakistan since 1990. We also 
analyze the impacts of financial restructuring by using various financial indicators. The overall 
results suggest that financial industry in Pakistan showing remarkable and unprecedented growth. 
Unlike 1990, the performance of financial sector is much better today. After the successfully 
completion of first generation of reforms, the introduction of second generation of reforms are 
required, which helps further strengthen the financial system and transform the benefits of the first 
generation of reforms to common man.  
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Introduction  
 
 In a modern economy, an efficient financial system is essential to facilitate 
economic transactions, specialization in production and establish investor-friendly 
institutions and competitive markets. A stable and efficient financial system not 
only reduces uncertainty and cost of transactions but also improves the overall 
economic efficiency through efficient allocation of resources. A more balanced 
and vibrant financial system will contribute to economic growth and stability of 
the economy.  In contrast, regulated financial systems led to underdeveloped and 
uncompetitive markets, with a financial sector dominated by government owned 
financial institutions that impose constraints on economic growth. It is now 
widely recognized that weak and inefficient financial systems are more vulnerable 
to contagion, less able to cope with volatile capital flows and exchange market 
pressures, and more likely to propagate and magnify the effects of financial crisis. 
This recognition has highlighted the need for global adoption of strengthened 
standards for banking supervision (IMF, 1996). The appropriate sequencing of 
financial sector restructuring and supervision policies have also become pressing 
issues in many LDCs, where a large part of the banking system is 
undercapitalized and insolvent, reflecting major macroeconomic shocks, large 
structural changes and weak banking supervision. The resulting distress in the 
financial system has, in turn, complicated monetary management and affected the 
effectiveness of stabilization policies (Sundararajan, 1996). 
 
 Since the early 1990s many developing countries have started to 
restructure their financial sector as a part of broader Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAP) which includes fiscal consolidation, reforms of the trade and 
exchange rate systems, price liberalization, deregulation of financial sector 
activities and other wide-ranging  measures to enhance the efficiency and supply 
responsiveness of the economy. These reforms were expected to bring about 
significant economic benefits, particularly through a more effective mobilization 
of domestic savings and efficient allocation of resources. Policies for restructuring 
the domestic financial system aimed at strengthening the role of market forces and 
competition through liberalization of interest rates, adoption of indirect monetary 
instruments, strengthening of prudential supervision and related market 
information system in order to deal effectively with interest rate and exchange 
rate risks and other banking risks, particularly in the context of capital account 
liberalization by enhancing bank's soundness and by promoting equity markets 
(IMF, 1995). Moreover, liberalization of current and capital accounts transactions 
aimed at better integrating the domestic financial system into world financial 
markets.  
 
 During the pre-reform period, the financial sector in Pakistan mainly 
accommodated the financing needs of the government, of public enterprises and 
of priority sectors. The private sector investment remained modest, and efforts to 
mobilize savings lacked dynamism of a competitive financial system. Financial 
intermediaries were insulated from competition in the domestic market through 
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oligopolistic practices and barriers to entry in the sector, and from outside 
competition through tight restrictions on current and capital accounts transactions 
(Khan, 1995). 
 
 In such an environment, which was typical of many pre-reform situations, 
distortions were widespread, interest rates were generally negative in real terms, 
taxing savers and providing incentives to inefficient investment, credit was 
rationed based on government determined priorities and excessive regulations 
hindered the activity of financial intermediation. Consequently, economic 
efficiency remained low and growth suffered from relatively low savings and 
investment rates in the private sector. 
 
 Like many other developing countries Pakistan also undertook the process 
of financial restructuring through reforms in early 1990s to establish a more 
market-based system of financial intermediation and government financing, 
conduct the monetary policy more efficiently through greater reliance on indirect 
instruments and increase the contribution to the rapid development of the stock 
markets. These reforms were primarily designed to correct the distortions implicit 
in the administered structure of rates of returns on various financial instruments, 
to abolish the directed and subsidized credit schemes, to allow free entry of 
private banks in the financial sector in order to enhance the competition and 
efficiency in the financial sector and to strengthen the State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP) supervision. 
 
 The main objective of this paper is to examine the financial restructuring 
efforts undertaken by the government of Pakistan to gain the efficiency in the 
financial sector. Moreover, the study also examine the outcomes resulted from the 
financial restructuring and suggest further improvement in this regard. The rest of 
the study is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical rationale of 
financial restructuring. Section 3 describes the financial restructuring process 
carried out so far in Pakistan, while section 4 assesses the results of restructuring 
in Pakistan. Some concluding remarks are given in section 5. 
 
2  Theoretical Rationale of Financial Sector Restructuring 
 
 The theoretical support for financial restructuring as a policy goal can be 
traced back to the fundamental theorem in welfare economics and the efficient 
market hypothesis. The fundamental theorem suggests that competitive markets 
lead to Pareto optimal equilibria, while the efficient market hypothesis argues that 
the financial sector use markets information efficiently. A combination of these 
two ensures the efficiency in the financial sector. The reform of the financial 
system removes market distortions that impede free market conditions (Eatwell, 
1996; Mavrotas and Kelly, 2001). Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that 
financial deepening is an essential ingredient of the process of capital 
accumulation, which in turn enhances economic growth through savings and 
investment. They further stated that financially repressed economy remain below 
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its market clearing values thereby generating less than the optimal amount of 
savings and thus detracting from the pool available for investment. The policy 
massage both financial and real sector development require a comprehensive 
package of financial restructuring that frees up interest rates to their market-
clearing levels and eliminates administratively-determined selective credit 
allocation (Chowdhury, 2000).  
 
 It is now general agreement among the economists that inappropriate 
regulatory and supervisory policies not only retard long-term economic growth 
but also increase the likelihood of financial crisis that could spread beyond the 
country’s own borders. Table 1 provides the importance of prudential and related 
regulations in the efficient management of the financial system.  
 
Table 1: Types of Financial Regulation: Objectives and Key Policy        
    Instruments 
Type of Regulation Objectives Key Policy Instruments 
Macroeconomic -To maintain control over aggregate 
economic activity. 
-To maintain internal and external 
balance 
Reserve requirement, direct 
credit and deposit ceilings, 
interest rate controls, 
restrictions on foreign capital 
Allocative -To influence the allocation of 
financial resources in favour of 
priority activities. 
Selective credit allocation, 
compulsory investment 
requirements, preferential 
interest rates. 
 
Structural 
-To control the possible abuse of 
monopoly power by dominates 
firms. 
Entry and merger controls, 
geographic and functional 
restrictions. 
Prudential -To preserve the safety and 
soundness of individual financial 
institution and sustain public 
confidence in systemic stability. 
Authorization criteria, 
minimum capital 
requirements, limits on the 
concentration of risks, 
reporting requirements. 
Organizational -To ensure smooth functioning and 
integrity of financial markets and 
information exchanges 
Disclosure of market 
information, minimum 
technical standards, rule of 
market making and 
participation. 
Protective -To provide protection to users of 
financial services, especially 
consumers and non-professional 
investors. 
Information disclosure to 
consumers, compensation 
funds, ombudsmen to 
investigate and resolve 
disputes. 
Source: Vittas (1992, p. 63) 
 
It is clear from table 1 that the debate related to liberalization has focused on the 
allocative aspect of the financial sector rather than prudential, organizational and 
protective regulations because of information problems. Barth, et al (1998) 
suggests that the following initial steps should be taken to reduce the likelihood of 
financial crisis: 
• Develop and improve legal systems and information disclosure; 
• Impose rate ceilings on bank deposits; 
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• Establish limits on the rate at which banks can expand credit or on 
the rate of increase in their exposure to certain sectors, such as real 
estates; 
• Required greater diversification of bank portfolios; and  
• Reduce the restrictions on the range of activities in which banks 
can engage. 
 
 They maintain that it is not possible to determine a priori which 
combination is most appropriate for individual country because of the different 
stages of development. Despite this, it would be essential to maintain that the 
central purpose of prudential and organizational regulations is to deal with failure 
associated with moral hazard while protective regulations focused on the need to 
design a fair financial system that protects the interests of the users of financial 
services. 
 
 Sheng (1996) defined financial restructuring as “the package or 
macroeconomic, microeconomic, institutional and regulatory measures taken to 
restore problem banking system to financial solvency and health”. The problem 
banking system may be defined in terms of non-performing loans (NPLs) and 
shortfall of credit requirement. Sheng says “that as a rule of thumb, banking 
distress is likely to become systemic when NPLs, net of provisions reached 
roughly 15% of the total loans”. Narasimham Committee on Banking Sector 
Reforms (1998) defines that “a weak bank should be one whose accumulated 
losses and net NPLs exceed its net worth or one whose operating profits less its 
income on recapitalization bonds is negative for three consecutive years”. 
Practically, financial restructuring is a complex process but it strengthens the 
balance sheet structure of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs). It 
can be argued that appropriate efforts are necessary to reverse the insolvency and 
poor profitability of banks. Moreover, the regulatory environment and supervisory 
institutions must be modernized and restructured (Hoelscher, 1998). These steps 
are necessary to ensure that banking failure does not jeopardize the stability of the 
financial institutions. The process of financial restructuring consists of four 
phases i.e. diagnosis, damage control, loss allocation and rebuilding profitability 
and creating the right incentives. If the diagnosis is done correctly, it would help 
the banks to know the extent and causes of loss by applying uniform accounting 
and auditing standards ─ especially loan classifications and interest accrual 
standards ─ for all banks. Damage control is basically meant for stopping the flow 
of future losses either by liquidating, enforcing hard budget constraint, changing 
management, etc. Loss allocation among different parties1 is the most difficult 
part of the financial restructuring and the successful restructuring depends on the 
loss allocation. Finally, the rebuilding profitability and creating right incentives 
required good policies, reliable and efficient management and a strong 
institutional framework.  
 
                                                 
1 Such as, owners, borrowers, depositors, regulators and government. 
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 There are two type of restructuring mechanism: one is market based 
solutions such as shareholder capital injection, sale or merger, liquidation without 
deposit compensation, etc. and the other involved the government intervention 
like liquidation with deposit insurance, formation of asset recovery trust, supply 
side solution, etc2. Dziobek and Pazarbasioughu (1988) propose two type of 
restructuring mechanism: financial and operational restructuring. According to 
them the aim of restructuring program is to restore the solvency and profitability 
of the banks. The bank solvency would emanate from shorter-term financial 
restructuring measures such as capital injection, long-term loan, swapping bonds 
for NPLs, etc.  While return to profitability requires more difficult and longer-
term operational restructuring such as improved cost effectiveness, better internal 
governance, effective risk management, etc. Hence, bank insolvency is dealt with 
by financial restructuring, while poor profitability is caused by some combination 
of NPLs and high operating costs. These problems are dealt with through the 
operational restructuring.  
 
 Mishkin (1996) has noted that “a non-linear disruption to financial 
markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much 
worse, so that the financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to 
economic agents who have the most productive investment opportunities”. There 
are four factors promoting financial crisis: increase in interest rates, increase in 
uncertainty, asset market effects on balance sheet, and bank panics. Hence, a 
strong regulatory and supervisory system is necessary to cop with the financial 
crisis and promotes the efficient functioning of financial markets. Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1997) showed that a mixture of bad policies and bad banking causes 
bank insolvency. Furthermore, excessive expansion of credit is also one of the 
main causes of insolvency. Besides bad banking and excessive credit expansion, 
there are so many causes which are cited in the literature such as asset-liability 
mismatches, insufficient diversification, directed lending, fraud, etc. Therefore, 
the challenge is to devise an appropriate regulatory framework that enables the 
banking system to be more resilient to insolvency. In addition, timing, 
sequencing, and speed of restructuring measures are very important for successful 
restructuring (Khatkhate, 1998 and Alawode and Ikhide, 1997).  
 
 Experiences of economies in transition illustrate that sequencing of bank 
restructuring and supervision policies have had a great impact on macroeconomic 
performance and financial market development. In Eastern and Central Europe, 
bank restructuring policies—recapitalization with government funds (Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland), carving out bad loans (Poland, Czech Republic), 
conversion of enterprise debt-to-equity (Bulgaria and Croatia) - were 
implemented in varying degrees since 1991 (Sundararajan, 1996). The 
effectiveness of financial restructuring requires sustained efforts towards 
stabilization and proper design and enforcement of bank restructuring and 
prudential supervision policies in order to avoid major disruption to growth and 
stability. 
                                                 
2 See Sheng (1996), p. 36. 
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 The sequencing financial restructuring and prudential supervision policies 
may be divided into three stages (Sundararajan, 1994 and Alexander et al, 1995). 
These three stages (Table 2) can provide guidelines for every country, pursuing 
restructuring and financial liberalization policies. 
 
Table 2: Financial Restructuring during the Various Stages 
of Financial Sector Reform 
Stage 1: Preparatory 
The preparatory stage include: 
• Introduction of a minimal program of financial restructuring policies to deal 
with fixed rate loans, selected nonperforming loans, capital adequacy and 
subsidized selective credit. 
• Review of legal and organizational arrangements for banking supervision. 
• Strengthen the licensing and entry regulations. Put in place a framework for 
orderly intervention and liquidation of banks. 
 
Stage 2: Initiating Market Development 
This stage includes the following measures: 
• Phase in the reform of commercial bank accounting and bank reporting systems, 
help to enforce prudential norms and facilitate monetary analysis. 
• Phase in the prudential regulations, particularly loans classification and 
provision, credit concentration limits, credit appraisal guidelines and foreign 
exchange exposure rules based on new accounting standards. 
• Strengthen and phase in the capital adequacy norms in line with bank 
restructuring strategy. 
• Introduction of a strategy to combine off-site, on-site, and external audit, and the 
balance among the components such as the availability of resources and 
technical assistance. 
• Active pursuit of Institutional development of banks. 
• Formulation of a comprehensive program of bank restructuring, bank 
liquidations, loan recovery and loan workout arrangements. Implementation of 
simple financial restructuring policies for banks - supported by enterprise 
financial restructuring (e.g. policies to reduce debt-equity ratio of non-financial 
firms and recapitalize banks through portfolio restructuring) as a part of this 
program. 
 
Stage 3: Strengthening Financial Markets 
During this stage the following steps are needed: 
• Continuation of comprehensive reforms to foster bank and enterprise 
restructuring systematically in lines with the program designed in stage 2. 
• Promotion of well-capitalized and well-supervised dealers in government 
securities (and money market instruments) as part of strengthening security 
market regulations and supervision. 
• Completion of reforms of bank accounting and prudential standards. 
•  Strengthen financial risk management in payment systems. 
• Strengthen supervision of asset-liability management (interest rate risks, 
liquidity management), internal controls, and management systems of banks. 
• Achievement of appropriate balance between off-site supervision, on-site 
inspection and external audit through technical assistance and training. 
• Close monitoring of risk implications of financial innovations and 
internationalization.  
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3.  Financial Restructuring in Pakistan 
 
 In Pakistan, the banking sector reforms were launched in the early 1990s. 
The objective of these reforms were to make the financial industry more 
competitive and transparent by privatizing formerly nationalized commercial 
banks, liberalizing interest rates and credit ceilings, strengthening the supervisory 
capacity of central bank and standardized accounting and auditing systems (Iimi, 
2004).  
 
 Prior to the 1990s, the financial sector in Pakistan remained heavily 
controlled3. Interest rates were set administratively and were usually remained 
negative in real terms. Monetary policy was conducted primarily through direct 
allocation of credit. Money market was under-developed, and bond and equity 
markets were virtually nonexistent. Commercial banks often had to lend priority 
sectors with little concern for the borrowing firm’s profitability. Despite the 
opening of non-bank financial sector for private investment in mid-1980s, state-
owned financial institutions hold almost 93.8 percent of the total assets of the 
entire financial sector at the end of 1980s. Moreover, the status of financial 
institutions were precarious due to, inter alia, high intermediation costs resulting 
from overstaffing, large number of loss-incurring branches, poor governance with 
low quality banking services, accumulation of non-performing loans and 
inadequate market capitalization. These inefficiencies and distortions caused 
severe macroeconomic difficulties in the late 1970s and 1980s and distorted 
economic growth. In order to remove these distortions and spur economic growth, 
the government of Pakistan undertook a wide range of reforms in the early 1990s 
to strengthen its financial system and to provide an adequate macroeconomic 
environment.  
 
 The financial sector reforms includes: (i) liberalization of interest rates by 
switching from an administrated interest rate setting to a market based interest 
rate determination; (ii) reduction of controls on credit by gradually eliminating 
directed and subsidized credit schemes, (iii) creation and encourage of the 
development of secondary market for government securities, (iv) strengthen the 
health and competition of the banking system by recapitalizing and restructuring 
the nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) increasing their autonomy and 
accountability, (v) improving the prudential regulations and supervision of all 
financial institutions, and (vi) allowing free entry of private banks in the financial 
market.  
  
 The financial sector reforms which were launched in the early 1990s can 
be classified into three phases. These three phases of financial sector reforms can 
be termed as first generation of reforms. 
  
                                                 
3 All commercial banks were nationalized in January, 1974, with the aim at making credit 
availability to highly priority sectors of the economy which previously had limited access to 
investable funds (see Haque and Kardar, 1993 for detailed account). 
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3.1 First Phase of Financial Reforms (1988 –1996) 
 
 The first phase reforms aimed at creating efficient, productive, and 
enabling environment of operational flexibility and functional autonomy. The first 
phase of financial reforms4 includes: first, the government liberalizes the market 
entry of private and foreign banks5 in order to gain efficiency and enhance 
competition within the financial sector. Secondly, two of the state-owned 
commercial banks, i.e. Muslim Commercial Bank (MCB) and Allied Bank 
Limited (ABL), were partially privatized between 1991 and 1993. Thirdly, major 
state-owned commercial banks and DFIs were downsized in terms of branches 
and employees. Fourthly, credit ceiling as an instrument of credit control was 
abolished, credit-deposit ratio (CDR) was also abolished and open market 
operation is now instrument of monetary policy and SBP at regular intervals 
conducted auctions of government securities. Fifthly, loan recovery process was 
strengthened by establishing banking courts and standardizing loan classification 
and accounting rules. Finally, State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) was granted full 
autonomy. However, the financial markets segmentation continued owning 
continuing controls on interest rates on government debts and to specialized credit 
programs.  
 
 
3.2 Second Phase of Financial Reforms (1997-2001) 
 
 In late 1996 the financial sector was on the verge of collapse (Table 3) 
with about one-third of the banking assets stuck up in the form of defaults and 
NPLs. Liquidity problems had begun to emerge as disintermediation spread and 
banking losses increased. Most cases of loan defaults remained unresolved 
because of the ineffective judiciary system. These problems rooted in a failure of 
governance and lack of financial discipline. Political interference had vitiated the 
financial intermediation function of the banking system and the borrowers 
expected not to repay loans they took, especially from NCBs and development 
finance institutions (DFIs).  NCBs and DFIs were the main loss makers because 
of over 90% of their loans are defaulted. Excess manpower, large branch network 
and undue interference by labour unions resulted large operating losses. Poor 
disclosure standards and corruption was widespread. These serious problems 
created a demand for further reforms. As a result, the second phase of banking 
sector reforms6 was introduced in the early 1997. These reforms addressed the 
fundamental causes of crisis and corruption and strengthen the corporate 
governance and financial discipline. In this regard, the cost structure of banks was 
firstly restructured through capital maintenance and increased by public funds. 
                                                 
4 The early phase of financial reforms as a part of financial restructuring policies started in the late 
1980s to earlier 1990s. 
5 10 new private banks started their operations in 1991 and 23 private domestic banks operating in 
the country including HBL, ABL, MCB and UBL. The process of liberalization started in the early 
1990s and except NBP more than 50 percent shares of the public sector have been privatized. 
There are about 14 foreign banks have been operating in the country. 
6 The second phase of banking sector reforms started from 1997 to 2001. 
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Secondly, partially privatized commercial banks were privatized completely. 
Third, bank branches were fully liberalized and allow private banks to grow faster 
and increase their market share. Fourthly, loan collateral foreclosure was 
facilitated and strengthened to reduce default costs and to expand lending to lower 
tier markets, including consumer banking. Fifthly, national savings schemes were  
 
Table 3: Selected Indicators of Vulnerability in Pakistan 
  (Period ended 1996) 
Macro Indicator 
Inflation > 5%                                                                                    10.7 
Fiscal Deficit > 2% of GDP                                                               6.5   
Public Debt > 50% of GDP                                                                Yes 
Current Account Deficit > 5% of GDP                                              7.4 
Short-term Flows > 50% of the Current Account Deficit                  Yes 
Capital Inflows > 5% of GDP                                                            Yes 
Ratio of Short-term Debt to International Reserves >1                      Yes  
Financial Sector Indicators 
Recent Financial Sector Liberalization                                               Yes  
Recent Capital Account Liberalization                                               No 
Credit to the Private Sector > 100% of GDP                                      17.1% 
Credit to the Private Sector (real growth) > 20%                                No 
Emphasis on Collateral when making loans                                       Yes   
Estimated Share of Bank Lending to the Real Estate Sector>20%     No 
Stock of Non-performing Loans > 10 % of Total Loans                    Yes 
Stock Market Capitalization as Percentage of GDP                           20.11%  
Source: Lindgren et al (1999), p. 11 
 
reformed so as to integrate with the financial market. Sixthly, mandatory 
placement of foreign currency deposits was withdrawn. Lastly, Strengthened SBP 
to play more effective role as regulator and guardian of the banking sector and 
phase out the direct and concessional credit programs to promote market 
integration. 
 
3.3  Third Phase of Financial Sector Reforms (2002-2004)  
 
 In this phase several major changes and significant positive shifts in the 
regulatory atmosphere to strengthen the financial system and introducing 
structural improvements. Some of the more important developments have been 
seen in the following areas: 
 
Consolidation, Privatization and Regulations: During the 1990s, mushroom 
growths in commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions have been seen 
and a few of which has low capitalization, inadequate/inappropriate staffing, poor 
risk management practices and a marginal portfolio quality. The central bank 
sought out to consolidate the banking sector by raising the minimum capital 
requirement. The minimum capital requirement was 1 billion for 2003, 1.5 billion 
for 2004 and is set at 2 billion for 2005. There have been 17 mergers and 
acquisitions and several in the pipeline. Weak entities have been eliminated. The 
average capital base of a commercial bank has risen from 1.8 billion for 2000 to 
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3.7 billion for 2003. Now all banks are required to maintain at least 8% of the risk 
weighted assets as capital requirement. 
 
 The regulatory oversight for a sizeable chink of the financial system (such 
as leasing companies, modarabas, investment banks, mutual funds and insurance 
companies) has been moved to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SECP), 
but SECP failed to build capacity in order to handle this inflows. The SECP lacks 
on-site inspection capability. 
 
Universal and Consumers Banking: Banks are allowed to form separate 
subsidiaries to function as mutual funds, asset management companies, venture 
capital, foreign exchange companies, etc. Furthermore, banks are encouraged to 
expand their lending operations to middle and lower income groups. A large 
range of consumer asset products such as credit cards, auto loans, clean 
installment loans, housing finance, etc., is being marketed aggressively. The 
NPLs in this sector is significantly lower than that of corporate sector. Similarly, 
SME financing has also become part of the lending toolkit. However, several 
banks are away from this sector because of high-risk perception. 
 
Automation and Prudential Regulations:  ATM coverage is relatively low and 
on-line banking offered by most of the banks. Central bank itself is making a 
significant progress in this area. Credit information date and credit rating agencies 
data is now available on line. 
 
 Similarly, central bank has been steadily moving away from its tradition of 
intrusive regulation and directed lending. Unlike late 1980s, much more 
permissive regulatory atmosphere prevails today. The central bank also 
modernized and revised prudential regulations for corporate and commercial 
banking, SME financing, Microfinance institutions and consumer financing. 
 
Banking Audit, Supervision and Corporate Governance:  SBP’s compliance 
with Basle Core Principles is generally high.  SBP now conduct comprehensive 
on-site inspections using a standardized CAMELSS7 for rating the overall 
condition of a bank. SBP also developing an early warning system called IRAF8.  
For the corporate governance, both SBP and SECP issued codes of corporate 
governance. Corporate disclosure standards have improved. However, there is a 
need to reform the taxation structure and the tax collecting institutions. 
 
Out-of-Court Settlement of NPLs: Two third of the stock of NPL involves a 
single lender. Recovery of NPLs involves internal and external hurdles. The 
pressure from influential borrowers often exerted through government, and 
intrusive regulatory environment. To reduce the level of NPLs, the government 
and SBP, established the committee for revival of sick industrial units (CRSIU) 
                                                 
7 CAMELSS indicate Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market 
Risk, Systems. 
8 IRAF indicate Institutional Risk Assessment Framework. 
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and corporate and industrial restructuring corporation (CIRC). The committee 
claims that it has revived 172 industrial units involving an outstanding NPLs of 
Rs. 46 billion. However, World Bank concluded regarding the assessment of 
CIRSU that “in the absence of operational analysis, there would generally appear 
little increment in the value of the project. Future viability and renewed distress of 
these projects are of concern. No track is kept of financial or operational details of 
the projects after revival”. In 2002 because of growing NPLs and the failure of 
CIRC, national accountability bureau (NAB) and CIRSU, the SBP issued 
guidelines whereby banks are actively encouraged to settle NPLs with borrowers 
at the fore sale value (FSV) of the underlying collateral. Under this scheme, 
borrowers were required to deposit 10% down payment at the time of signing the 
settlement agreement and repay remaining amount in 12 quarterly installments. 
This scheme encourages a lot of defaulters to come forward and settle their long-
standing liabilities. Similarly, under the debt recovery program, EDR (Excess 
Debt Recovery) had write-off efficiency ratio of 5:1(i.e. for each of provisions 
written off it would generate a cash recovery of Rs. 5). Under these guidelines Rs. 
52 billion of NPL has been settled at the cost of around Rs. 35 billions.   
 
4.  Results of the Financial Restructuring  
 
 The objectives of financial restructuring policies were to forestall a 
generalized banking system collapse and to establish a viable banking system in 
the country. It was expected that financial and operational restructuring policies 
strengthened the microeconomic foundations of the banking system. However, 
commercial banks have been slow to mobilize deposits, which play a significant 
role in financial intermediation. As Akhtar (2007) pointed out that the successful 
transformation and restructuring of the financial industry depends on some critical 
factors such as: (i) promoting higher degree of depth and efficiency in financial 
intermediation process by effective resource mobilization and channeling these 
resources to promote economic growth, (ii) improving the financial performance 
and strengthening soundness of financial institutions, and (iii) extending the 
outreach of financial services to poor segment of the society.  
 
 We therefore, briefly discuss the impact of the financial sector reforms 
under the following headings: 
 
 
a. Interest Rate Policies 
 
 Interest rates directly affect the business conditions and economic 
activities and thus represent a powerful policy instrument. In Pakistan before 
financial reforms, interest rates were set administratively and were often negative 
in real terms. For example, deposits were paid negative real return, thus 
discouraging savings in the country. Ceilings on interest rates were imposed with 
the desire to provide low-cost financing to encourage investment, particularly in 
the priority sectors. However, restrictions on interest rates led to financial 
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disintermediation, as savers and investors sought alternative outlets outside the 
formal financial system. Consequently, financial deepening was hindered, and 
financial resources were not directed into productive activities. 
 
 After liberalization, the price of financial services was intended to be 
determined by the banks on competitive basis, with little intervention from the 
SBP. To achieve the twin objectives of reducing government cost of borrowing on 
domestic debt and encouraging private sector credit expansion, the SBP has been 
pursuing a relatively easy monetary policy since July 1995 to July 2000. The 
weighted average lending rate gradually come down from 15.6 percent in 1998 to 
8.819 percent in June 2005, but the real interest rate has increased from 3.6 
percent in 1996 to 10.9 percent in 2000 and then following the declining trend and 
reached to –0.49 percent in June 2005 (see table 4). This reduction in lending rate 
indicates a little improvement in the profitability of the banks but purely ad hoc 
and not in the lines of the liberalization. Similarly, the weighted average deposit 
rate reduced from 6.8 percent in 1998 to 1.37 percent in June 2005; the real 
deposit rate remained negative except for the period 1999-2002. This reduction in 
the deposit rate will reduce the savings even further.  
 
Table 4:  Interest Rate Behaviour in Pakistan 
Weighted average 
Lending Rate 
Weighted average 
Deposit Rate 
Interest Rate Spread Year Inflation 
Rate 
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real 
1990-95 10.57 12.55 1.98 6.53 -4.05 6.02 5.95 
1996 10.8 14.4 3.6 6.4 -4.4 8.00 8.00 
1997 11.8 14.6 2.8 6.8 -5.0 7.8 7.8 
1998 7.8 15.6 7.8 6.8 -1.0 8.8 8.8 
1999 5.7 14.8 9.1 6.5 0.8 8.3 8.3 
2000 3.6 13.52 10.9 5.47 1.9 8.05 9.00 
2001 4.4 13.61 9.21 5.27 0.87 8.34 8.34 
2002 3.5 13.19 9.69 3.61 0.11 9.58 9.58 
2003 3.1 9.40 6.3 1.61 -1.49 7.79 7.79 
2004 4.6 7.28 2.68 0.95 -3.65 6.33 6.33 
2005 9.3 8.81 -0.49 1.37 -7.93 7.44 7.44 
Source: SBP Annual Reports (various issues). 
 The interest rate spread10 is an important indicator for the financial 
sector’s competitiveness, profitability and efficiency. Spread typically declined 
when competition among banks increases to access the financial market to 
increase their customer’s base. But in Pakistan, the high lending rate and low 
deposit rate have generated large spread11 nearing 7.44 percent in June 2005 as 
                                                 
9  Although in 2004 the rate fell to 7.28 percent. 
10 Interest Rate Spread = (Average Lending Rate – Average Deposit Rate). 
11 High interest rate spread is generated by factors such as high administrative costs, overstaffing 
and unavoidable burden of non-performing loans (for further detail, SBP’s financial sector 
assessment 2003-2004).  
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against 6.33 percent in 2004. The high lending rate will increase the cost of 
borrowing and hence discourage investment. The low deposit rates discourage 
both consumption and savings, resulting high debt/GDP ratio, deterioration of 
banks balance sheet, lowering economic growth, and increase in poverty. 
Furthermore, the large spread also reflects perceived sovereign risk (Khan, 2003).  
 
 However, the efforts of the SBP to enhance competition helped to narrow 
the spread to 6.33% in 2004. But this trend reverse and the spread rose again to 
7.44% by the end of June 2005 and the commercial banks re-pricing their loans in 
lines with the upward adjustment in SBP repo rate in the wake of high inflation 
without any rise in deposit rates. Hence, measures should be taken to bring down 
the interest rate spread close to zero in order to enhance both savings and 
investment in the country. 
 
b. Performance and Efficiency of Financial Institutions  
 
 The performance and efficiency of a financial institution involves two 
aspects, namely, solvency and sustainable profitability. Solvency improving 
measures affect bank's balance sheet while profitability measures affect the bank's 
income. The improvement in the banking performance emanates from financial 
restructuring operations. NPLs can be used as an indicator to measure the 
performance of financial institutions.  In Pakistan the NCBs and the DFIs have 
been facing the problem of NPLs, which increased from Rs. 25 billion in 1989 to 
Rs. 128 billion in June 1998, or 4% of the GDP. Moreover, the NPLs increased 
from Rs. 230.7 billion in December 1999 to Rs. 240.1 billion in December 2000.  
However, some significant efforts were made by the government to recover 
default loans. As a result, NPLs, in gross as well as net terms have followed a 
declining trend since 2001 showing an improvement in loan appraisal standards 
and market discipline. Furthermore, as banking sector registered a growth in 
advances, the ratio of NPLs to advances showing a sharp declining trend (table 5).  
 
Table 5: Non-performing Loans of the Banking System  
Year NPL’s (in 
Billions) 
Gross NPLs to 
Advances (in %) 
Provisions to 
NPLs (in %) 
Net NPL to Net 
Advances (in %) 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005  
173.0 
183.0 
230.7 
240.1 
244.1 
231.5 
222.7 
211.2 
177.3 
23.5 
23.1 
25.9 
23.5 
23.4 
21.8 
17.0 
11.6 
8.3 
46.6 
58.6 
48.6 
55.0 
54.7 
60.6 
63.9 
70.4 
76.7 
- 
11.1 
15.3 
12.2 
12.1 
9.9 
6.9 
3.8 
2.1 
Source: SBP Annual report (various issues)  
 
 The financial institutions are succeeded to bring down NPLs from 25.9% 
to 8.3% of the total advances of the banks and DFIs at the end of 2005. The net 
NPLs (net loan ratio), which is a more appropriate measure, was still about 2.1%. 
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These indicators revealed a very impressive performance of the banking sectors 
because in the late 1996, the banking system was on the verge of a crisis with 
about one-third of its assets stuck up in the form of default and NPLs.  
 
  
 
c. Money and Credit Policies 
 
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pakistan conducted monetary policy 
through direct control on credit and interest rates. Banking system was not 
generally competitive and major banks were owned by the state. In addition, 
banks and other financial institutions were required to hold part of their portfolios 
in government debt at below market rates. The government directed bank loans to 
state owned-enterprises. The range of financial instruments available to banks and 
the public intended to be narrow with maturity structure and yields unrelated to 
risk and liquidity. 
 
 In recent years, Pakistan has started to reform the monetary policy by 
using indirect or market-based instruments to achieve the macroeconomic 
stability. In 1995, the SBP shifted the emphasis from direct to indirect instruments 
i.e. open market operations including rediscount window, liquidity auctions, 
repurchase agreements and overdraft facility. The monetary authorities have 
sought to reduce direct government interventions and strengthen the role of 
market forces in allocating financial resources in order to improve the capacity of 
institutions to mobilize domestic savings, improve the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy, enhance competition among the banks and strengthen bank's 
financial soundness. 
 
 To measure the improvement in the financial intermediation capacity of 
the banking system following the financial restructuring process, the standard 
indicators used in this paper include the ratios of currency to broad money (M2), 
ratio of currency to GDP, M2/GDP, M3/GDP, M1/M2, the ratio of private sector 
credit to GDP and market capitalization12. Table 5 represents the entire situation 
after the introduction of financial sector reforms. 
 
 The ratio of currency to broad money (M2) would tend to fall in the 
financial environments where market forces dominate, where there are alternative 
saving investment instruments (stocks, bonds, mutual funds etc.) that raise real 
rate of return, where there is a confidence in the banking system and where access 
to the banking system has expanded. The ratio fell from 37.56% in 1990 to 23% 
in 2005. This implies the domination of market forces and retains the confidence 
of customer on the banking system. Furthermore, the low ratio of currency to 
                                                 
12 M1 is the currency in circulation plus demand deposits. M2 is M1 plus time deposit, foreign 
currency deposits. M3 is M2 plus other type of deposits, as well as short-term money market 
instruments such as certificates of deposits. In the case of Pakistan M3 includes M2 plus NSS, 
NBFIs. 
 16  
 
 
Table 5: Indicators of Financial Deepening (in percent) 
Indicators 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Currency/M2  45.13  32.29 32.28 37.56 27.80 26.02 25.30 25.04 23.99 23.00 
Currency/GDP  16.06 13.53 13.29 14.73 10.82 10.31 11.08 11.77 11.84 11.18 
Broad Money (M2)/GDP 34.03 33.90 41.24 39.24 38.93 39.64 43.80 46.99 49.36 48.61 
M3/GDP - - 51.60 60.63 57.98 55.90 60.8 64.36   
M1/M2 - - 67.10 76.01 59.32 58.48 58.01 61.23 61.78 72.48 
Private Sector Credit/GDP 19.60  19.24 21.45 19.92 22.33 22.02 21.92 24.87 29.30 28.44 
Stock market capitalization/GDP 8.42 4.08 3.75 4.68 10.24 8.15 9.26 15.48 24.05 30.95 
Sources: calculated by authors using IFS and SBP data 
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money mainly reflects advancements in the payment system, which heavily relies 
on credit cards; the development of the banking system and the money can be 
transfer between checking and savings accounts easily without any significant 
cost  
 
 During the financial restructuring process, the ratio M2 to GDP tends to 
rise as access to banking and saving instruments spreads. But as markets mature, 
the ratio M2/GDP tends to decline as other financial instruments outside the M2 
aggregate become available. The ratio M2/GDP which was 39.24 percent in 1999, 
reached to 48.61 percent at the end of 2005. This reflects mainly due to the 
improvement of the domestic financial system.  
 
 The ratio of currency to GDP tend to decreased from 14.73% in 1990 to 
11.18% in 2005 implying that the banking system is relatively developed. There 
are significant foreign currency deposits in the banking system and substantial 
real rate of interest on saving accounts in domestic currency.  
 
 The ratio of M1/M2 provides a proxy for the extent to which the financial 
system of a country succeeded in mobilizing savings. In 1990, the ratio was 
76.01, which come down to 58.01 percent in 2003.  This reflects mainly due to 
the development of the banking sector, significant increase in foreign currency 
deposits and substantial real interest rate on savings. It starts increasing from 
58.01 percent from 2003 and reached to 72.48 percent at the end of 2005. This 
implies the reduction of savings due to the negative real rate returns on deposits. 
 
 The share of private sector credit to GDP is one of the important indicators 
of allocative efficiency when compared with that of government sector. Credit to 
the private sector would be expected to expand when banks are successfully 
restructured. In addition, this ratio also reflects whether private sector receives 
sufficient resources to carry out its economic activities. It has fuelled economic 
activity, revived and enhanced industrial capacities and supported steady growth 
in services sector whose contribution to the GDP is nearly 52.3%.  The ratio of 
private-sector credit to GDP increased from 19.92% in 1990 to 28.44% in 2005. 
In addition, fiscal adjustment efforts, privatization of some public enterprises and 
liberalization of interest rates all had clearly enhanced the private sector's access 
to the banking system. 
 
 The stock market capitalization, which was 4.68 percent of the GDP in 
1990, is 30.95 percent of the GDP in 2005. This implies the promotion of trading 
activities. However, the secondary market is not yet operating efficiently and 
remains very thin and bank financing remains the main source of funds for 
productive investment.  Furthermore, the foreign access to the stock market is 
limited because of a number of factors including macroeconomic weaknesses, 
inadequate transparency and accounting standards and a cumbersome and opaque 
regulation environment. In addition, there are some restrictions on the capital 
movements for non-residents and are also ceilings on non-resident's shares in 
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company's equity. Moreover, bond markets barely constituting 5-7% of GDP and 
the low pension and insurance coverage. 
 
 
 
d. Profitability and Financial Soundness 
 
 After years of poor profitability, the returns on assets and equity are 
beginning to increase. Net interest income decreased from 69% in 2001 to 58.2 in 
2003. This reduction of net interest income is mainly due to contraction in interest 
margin. As a result, the share of net interest income in gross income declined to 
58.2% (Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Banking Sector Earnings and Profitability. 
Earning and Profitability 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Return on assets after tax  -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 0.1 1.0 
Return on equity after tax -6.2 -0.3 -0.3 13.8 22.1 
Net interest income to gross income 54.3 61.2 68.9 67.4 58.2 
Non-interest expenses to gross income 76.9 71.6 62.7 57.3 50.4 
Personnel expenses to non-interest expenses 57.0 54.3 52.6 51.4 50.1 
Non-interest income to total income 17.6 16.5 14.5 18.1 30.9 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan 
 
 Akhtar (2007) has pointed out that the profits of commercial banks 
crossed over $1 billion for the first three quarters of 2006. She further noted that 
from 2000-2006, the returns on assets of banks rose from -0.2% to 2.1% and 
return on equity from -3.5% to 26.1%. This increase in profit may be attributed to 
many factors such as: (i) a rise in earning assets of commercial banks to 85% in 
September 2006 which is significantly above the pre-reform period and a rise in 
advances to total assets from 49.1% in 2000 to 55.1% in September 2006, (ii) a 
decline in the total and operating expenses to income , (iii) a rise in the SME, 
consumer finance and agriculture sector lending which constitutes over one third 
of total outstanding advances, (iv) a high share of non-interest bearing deposits 
and declined share of fixed deposits, and (v) a growth of service charges by the 
use of electronic banking.  Furthermore, it can be argued that privatization of 
financial industry has had distinct impact on the profitability of the banking 
sector, though its impact on efficiency is relatively weak13. However, it is 
expected that over the period of time there will be more progress in these areas. 
  
e. Privatization Policy 
 
 The structure of the financial sector in Pakistan has substantially changed 
following privatization of the state-owned commercial banks. In 1990, the 
financial system was fully dominated by five state-owned commercial banks. 
During the first round of financial sector reforms, two state-owned commercial 
banks ─Muslim Commercial Bank (MCB) and Allied Bank Limited (ABL) 
                                                 
13 State Bank of Pakistan (2005). 
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─were privatized between 1991 and 1993. The reform process was subsequently 
delayed for several years and again resumed in the early 2000s. With the 
privatization on third large commercial bank, United Bank Limited (UBL), in 
2002, the domination of the state-owned commercial banks was ended. As of 
September 2003, the asset share of domestic private banks and public sector 
commercial banks was 47% and 41% respectively. Furthermore, when the 
privatization of Habib Bank Limited (HBL) was completed in 2004, the share of 
banking system assets held by public sector commercial banks decreased to less 
than 25%. Today National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) is the only state-owned 
commercial bank with a market share of approximately 20%. 
 
 The privatization of nationalized commercial banks and DFIs poses a 
serious challenge to the government. The government facilitated bank 
restructuring process by recapitalization of banks through (i) equity injection of 
Rs. 46 billion in some of the public sector banks and write offs equivalent to Rs. 
51 billion, (ii) lay-off of close to 35000 employees in two phases14  from public 
banks, and  (iii) closing off over 2000 loss incurring bank branches. 
 
f. Corporate Governance 
 
 The efforts of SBP helped in bringing a positive change in the corporate 
governance standards of banks. Banks and other financial institutions are now 
managed by better cadre of professionals and stakeholders now play an active role 
in the affairs of banks. Regularly board meetings, and financial reporting 
standards, disclosure and transparency helped to improve the corporate 
governance. Improvement in corporate governance helped to ensure high degree 
of financial stability. 
 
 From December 2002 to December 2005, the balance sheet of the banking 
system has recorded a growth of 64.5%, which is quite significant. Since 2002, 
the deposits of the banking system registered the growth of 69%. Return on assets 
after tax increased from 0.1% in 2002 to 1.9% in 2005 and was further increased 
to 2.1% by the end of September 2006. Loan portfolio of the banking system got 
double in the last three years. Credit growth is now fairly diversified. All these 
achievements are resulted due to the good governance policies. 
 
On the basis of above analysis, we reached the following conclusions:  
 
• Financial markets now become more competitive and relative efficient 
but still remain shallow. There are many financial instruments 
available for transactions but the evolution of new instruments has to 
remain on track.  
 
• Although the financial infrastructure has been strengthened, but the 
                                                 
14 In 1997 almost 24000 employees were laid off and in the second phase around 11700 employees 
were relieved (Akhtar, 2007). 
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legal system is still complicated, time consuming and costly for 
ordinary customers. Furthermore, regulatory environment has been 
improved and monitoring system is much better today but enforcement 
and corrective capabilities need to further strengthened.  
 
• Further development of long-term bond markets, further improvements 
of corporate governance, reinforcement of regulatory and supervisory 
arrangements, expansion of investor's base, improvement of equity 
market infrastructure, revaluation of market volatility-controlling 
mechanisms and sequencing the reforms are also need to enhance. 
 
 The Second Generation of Reforms 
 
 The first generation of reforms launched in the early 1990s gained roots 
and the financial industry in Pakistan is now ready to shift its focus to a second 
generation of reforms. The second generation reforms not only help in achieving 
macroeconomic stability but also create enabling environment for sustainable 
economic growth. Institutional strengthening, macroeconomic stability, protection 
of property rights, and legal and financial infrastructure development should be 
the main pillars of the second generation of reforms. The main ingredients of 
second generation of reforms include: 
 
(i) Macroeconomic Stability 
 It can be thought that banking system could easily be weakened by high 
and volatile real interest rates, owing to inappropriate fiscal policies that entail 
excessive borrowing from the commercial banks, inefficiencies in the payment 
system that encourage fraud, and loss-incurring banks. In order to maintain 
stability within the liberalized financial system, it is necessary to ensure that the 
fiscal position should be sound, banks should be well capitalized, and the payment 
systems should be modernized. To achieve these objectives the authorities should 
ensure stable and enabling macroeconomic conditions because it is inadequate to 
promote financial liberalization whereas the structural and macroeconomic 
problems remained unresolved. 
 
(ii) Improvement in Governance. 
 An improvement in governance would ensure greater transparency and 
accountability, a more secure and predictable environment for domestic and 
foreign investment, and promote greater ownership of the reform efforts. In 
Pakistan there is still need to clarify rules related to governance. Hence, attention 
should be paid to clarified and conform rules that should be consistent to the 
international standard. 
 
(iii) Strengthen Institutional Capacity and Protection of Property Rights. 
 For the economic stabilization and sustainable economic growth, 
institutional strengthening and risk taking ability of economic agent is necessary. 
Macroeconomic stabilization requires strong institutional coordination between 
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monetary and fiscal authorities. Strong institutions and protection and 
simplification of property rights should given an important place in the second 
generation reform agenda.  Furthermore, up-gradation and encouragement of 
institutions such as SMEs, microfinance, consumer finance, housing finance and 
rural banking will accelerate the momentum of financial industry because of the 
access of vast majority of the population to financial services. Hence, there should 
be urgent need for further develop and strengthen these institutions. 
 
(iv) Streamline Venture Capital Funds and Private Equity Funds 
  
 Venture capital and private equity funds, private pension and provident 
funds and insurance companies are the most effective means for financing 
innovative firms in the economy. The authorities should streamline these funds 
and encourage their growth. 
 
(v)  Strengthen the Legal and Financial Infrastructure 
 
 Accountability and enforcement of financial contracts requires that we 
have a legal system that dispenses justice quickly and inexpensively. But our legal 
procedure is too lengthy. There is need to review banking laws and procedures to 
make them simple and less abrupt. Hence, this area needs special attention.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 Financial restructuring is a continuous process not an event. Prior to 1990, 
the financial sector in Pakistan was characterized by weakness in banking and 
corporate governance, weak accounting standards, lack of market discipline, weak 
prudential regulation and poor legal infrastructure. These problems increased the 
exposure of financial institutions to a variety of external threats, including decline 
in asset values, market contagion, speculative attacks, exchange rate devaluation, 
and reversal of capital flows. Furthermore, capital flight and disrupted credit 
allocation further deteriorated the efficiency of banking sector. In the background 
of the arising situations of financial sector in Pakistan, a number of restructuring 
measures were undertaken since 1990 with a view to bring back financial 
discipline and improving operational efficiency of the financial sector. The 
financial sector restructuring program was instituted in 1990 and ended its 
activities in 2004. In response to financial restructuring measure, financial 
discipline and operational efficiency showed a significant improvement today 
than pre-1990.  Pakistan has made considerable progress during the past one and 
half decade in reforming its financial sector. Financial restructuring and 
privatization have changed the landscape of the financial industry in Pakistan. 
However, the secondary market is relatively thin and as such the supply of 
corporate securities remains small but the change is more fundamental in banking 
relative to equity markets. The development of capital market is related to a range 
of economic, financial, institutional and legal factors that need to be addressed 
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properly.  
 
 Furthermore, the legal infrastructure must be developed for financial 
supervision, bankruptcy and foreclosure. Bank secrecy laws should be improved 
to enhance transparency and deposit insurance scheme is needed to maintain 
confidence on the financial system. Early warning system and prompt corrective 
actions are needed. The study further concludes that without further improvement 
of the corporate governance and expansion of investor's base, capital markets 
cannot be developed. Moreover, until the equity markets are strengthened, the 
capital market cannot function well to complement the banking sector. More 
openness, together with more transparency and disclosure of information, should 
contribute significantly to financial restructuring of the economy and integrating 
into the global economy. Although, Pakistan restructure its financial sector 
successfully within a very short period, but the sustainability and performance of 
financial sector reforms required (Akhtar, 2007): 
• Macroeconomic stability, 
• A greater degree of consolidation should be necessary for strong 
and robust banking, 
• Prudent regulatory and supervisory framework, 
• Maturity and reorientation of financial industry, 
• A well diversified and competitive financial system is still needed, 
• Strong corporate governance, effective risk management system 
and mitigation, and 
• Financial system should be socially inclusive and should facilitate 
access to financial services. 
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